🧭 Why Step 4? #
You defined what each station must achieve in Step 3. Now ask:
“How can each function fail, why would it fail, and what happens if it does?”
This step creates the backbone of your risk evaluation: unambiguous chains that will be rated in Step 5 and improved in Step 6.
🎯 Objectives #
- Write precise, testable Failure Modes (deviations from Step-3 specs).
- Trace Effects at the next operation/line and the end user/vehicle.
- Identify specific Causes using 6M (Man, Machine, Method, Material, Measurement, Mother Nature).
- List current Prevention & Detection controls (as-is), and set initial Severity (S).
🧩 What “good” looks like #
- Function: Press impeller to 12.00 ± 0.05 mm with OK force-distance signature
- Failure Mode (FM): Press depth undersize (<11.95 mm) or oversize (>12.05 mm); signature out-of-window
- Effect (Line): Low retention → slip at run-up / early leak
- Effect (End User): Low/zero flow → engine overheat; leak complaint
- Cause: Fixture hard-stop drift; excessive lube; shaft OD low; press profile mis-set
- Prevention: Hard-stop setting SOP + PM; incoming OD control; lube spec
- Detection: LVDT 100% + signature window; SPC depth chart; daily master checks
- S (initial): 10 (engine overheat if undetected & shipped)
Rule of thumb: Write FMs as measurable deviations; write Effects at two levels (line + end user); write Causes at component/tool/method granularity.
🔗 Severity Anchors (examples) #
- S=10: Safety or regulation-critical user effect (e.g., engine overheat due to insufficient flow).
- S=8–9: Major vehicle function loss (e.g., coolant leak leading to breakdown).
- S=6–7: Performance degradation/latent field failure (e.g., intermittent electrical).
- S=4–5: Nuisance/customer dissatisfaction (noise, rework only).
(Confirm exact scale per your AIAG-VDA table/customer CSRs.)
📋 PFMEA Failure Chains — Worked Examples (copy into your sheet) #
| # | Station (Op) | Function (from Step 3) | Failure Mode (deviation) | Effect – Next Process/Line | Effect – End User/Vehicle | S | Likely Causes (6M) | Current Prevention Controls | Current Detection Controls | Evidence/Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | OP05 Press-fit | Press impeller to 12.00 ± 0.05 mm; signature OK | Depth undersize/oversize; signature out-of-window | Low retention, slip at OP11 spin | Low/zero flow → overheat | 10 | Machine: hard-stop drift; Method: wrong press profile; Material: shaft OD low; Man: lube over-apply | Hard-stop setup SOP; profile locked; incoming OD spec; lube spec | LVDT 100%, force signature match; SPC; daily master | Keep last 30 subgroup chart; master results |
| 2 | OP05 Press-fit | same | Spline/impeller crack (overforce) | Crack propagates; early failure | Leak/low flow field failure | 8 | Machine: press over-force; Material: brittle impeller lot; Method: no soft-start | Force window limits; supplier COA | Signature window; visual audit | COA + incident log |
| 3 | OP06 Seal install | Install seal orientation; cleanliness | Seal mis-orientation / damaged lip | Fail at OP10/12; rework | Coolant leak at customer | 8 | Man: handling; Machine: nest mis-align; Environment: cleanliness | Guided fixture; chamfers; handling WI | Vision 100%; particle gate; OP10 pre-leak | Vision false accept rate trending |
| 4 | OP06 Seal install | Maintain shaft Ra ≤0.30 µm | Surface roughness high | Accelerated wear | Leak in service | 8 | Material: incoming shaft finish; Method: skipped audit | COA; Ra audit plan | OP10/12 tests (late); random Ra measurement | Consider earlier Ra check |
| 5 | OP07 Potting/ESD | Dispense mass/time; cure profile; ESD <100 V | ESD event uncontrolled (no strap/mat fail) | Latent PCB damage; passes OP11 | Intermittent failure in field | 9 | Measurement: ESD tester faulty; Method: bypass checks; Environment: dry air | ESD policy; start-of-shift check | ESD monitor log (manual); OP11 may not detect | D likely high; plan continuous monitor |
| 6 | OP07 Potting | Mass/time; cure profile | Mass low / voids; under-cure | Moisture ingress; OP11 pass; OP12 pass | Early electronics failure | 7 | Machine: dispenser drift; Method: wrong recipe; Material: resin aged | Recipe lock; PM on dispenser; FEFO for resin | Scale log 100%; cure profile log | Add in-process mass check |
| 7 | OP09 Torque | Tighten to 4.0 ± 0.3 N·m + angle | Under-torque | Joint loosening; leak at OP12 | Leak / vibration in field | 9 | Machine: tool calibration drift; Method: wrong strategy; Man: wrong socket | Torque strategy; tool cal schedule | 100% torque/angle trace; socket ID | Daily audit curves |
| 8 | OP09 Torque | same | Over-torque / cross-thread | Cracked housing; scrap/rework | Leak in service | 8 | Man: mis-start; Machine: tool strategy; Material: thread burrs | Thread-start aid; SOP | Curve pattern check; visual thread check | Add thread forming guidance |
| 9 | OP10 Pre-leak | Air decay ≤ X @ 1.0 bar | Bench recipe mis-set / leak at fixture | False pass/false fail; late discovery at OP12 | Leak reaches customer if OP12 bypassed | 8 | Method: unlocked recipe; Machine: valve seal wear | Recipe lock; PM seals | Daily master part; result to MES | If both weak → high D |
| 10 | OP12 Final leak/flow | Leak ≤0.5 @1.5 bar; Flow ≥35 L/min @ ΔP 20 kPa | Recipe wrong / test bypass | Unit ships untested | Leak / overheat in field | 10 | Measurement: role mis-config; Tool: bench comms lost; Method: manual override | MES role-based lock; No scan → no progress gate | Auto-upload curves; bench heartbeat | Audit logs reviewed? |
| 11 | OP12 Final flow | Flow ≥35 L/min @ ΔP 20 kPa | Meter mis-cal / clogged filter → false pass | Low flow escapes | Overheat in field | 10 | Measurement: missed cal; Environment: temp/viscosity | Cal matrix; temp comp; filter PM | Daily master at 2 points; curve plausibility | Add dual-check (ΔP vs RPM sanity) |
| 12 | OP01 Kitting | Assign serial; verify kit | Wrong impeller variant in kit | Fail at OP12 (low flow) | Overheat in field if undetected | 10 | Material: barcode duplication; Man: kit mix; Method: no double-scan | Two-scan check; kit layout; color coding | Scanner + MES kit check 100% | Add vision shape check |
| 13 | Interface – MES | No scan → no progress | Gate disabled / role override | Downstream tests not tied to unit | Untested unit ships | 10 | Method: IT role; Machine: network outage | Role policy; IT change control | Gate audit log | Add automated alerts |
| 14 | OP08 Connector | Fit/Join per spec | Mis-seat / incomplete crimp | Intermittent current; OP11 fail or pass | Intermittent field failure | 7 | Man: technique; Machine: crimp wear; Measurement: pull test gap | Crimp PM; WI with photos | Pull test (sample); vision 100% for features | Increase sample on pull |
How to use: Keep Functions identical to Step 3 wording. Phrase FMs as quantified deviations. List Effects at both levels. Causes should be specific and verifiable. Controls reflect current state only (don’t pre-write actions).
🧠 Writing Tips (with examples) #
Bad FM: “Press not OK.”
Good FM: “Press depth <11.95 mm or >12.05 mm OR force signature outside window.”
Bad Cause: “Operator error.”
Good Cause: “Operator applied excess lube (2× spec) causing hydraulic lock,” or “Hard-stop set +0.15 mm post-PM.”
Effects: Always include line effect (scrap/rework/late detection) and end-user effect (safety, regulatory, performance). Severity is set from the end-user effect if the defect escapes.
🧯 Prevention vs Detection (don’t mix them) #
- Prevention controls influence Occurrence (O) (design of process: fixtures, recipes, tooling strategy, PM, training, incoming controls).
- Detection controls influence Detection (D) (what checks/tests can catch the defect before ship: gages, benches, vision, SPC, interlocks, curve storage).
In Step 5, justify O with evidence (capability, PM compliance, MSA). Justify D with coverage & timing (100% vs sampled, early vs late, automated vs manual).
🧱 6M Cause Library (starter list to seed brainstorming) #
- Man: certification lapsed; fatigue; ESD strap not worn; wrong socket; improper lube technique.
- Machine: servo press drift; DC tool calibration; vision lighting; leak bench valve leak; flow meter drift.
- Method: recipe unlocked; wrong press profile; missing thread-start step; potting start/stop timing; no “no scan → no progress.”
- Material: impeller ID spread; brittle batch; seal hardness out of spec; resin past shelf life; wrong screw finish.
- Measurement: LVDT out of cal; master part unstable; pull tester mis-zero; temp probe offset.
- Mother Nature: humidity <30% (ESD risk); temp shift affecting viscosity and ΔP; airborne particles at seal station.
📑 Template (paste into your PFMEA workbook) #
| Process Step | Function (from Step 3) | Failure Mode (deviation) | Effect – Line | Effect – End User | S | Cause (6M) | Current Prevention | Current Detection | Notes/Evidence |
|---|
(Fill one row per failure chain. Add your PFMEA Row ID to link later to Control Plan and Actions.)
✅ Outputs of Step 4 #
- ✅ Clear Cause → Failure Mode → Effects chains for each critical station & interface.
- ✅ Initial Severity (S) assigned from the end-user effect.
- ✅ Current controls captured, ready to justify O and D in Step 5.
- ✅ A prioritized list of chains to rate first (press-fit, seal, torque, leak/flow, ESD, MES gates).
⚠️ Common Pitfalls (and fixes) #
| Pitfall | Fix |
|---|---|
| Vague FMs (“not ok”) | Use measurable deviations & thresholds. |
| Effects only at line level | Add end-user effect; S comes from there. |
| Generic causes (“operator error”) | Make causes specific and auditable. |
| Controls written as future actions | Document current controls only; actions are Step 6. |
| Skipping interfaces (MES, recipe lock) | Add interface rows—they prevent major escapes. |
🔗 What’s Next #
Proceed to Lesson 5.5 — Step 5: Risk Analysis (S-O-D & AP). You’ll assign Occurrence and Detection ratings using the controls listed here and determine Action Priority (AP) to drive Step 6 improvements.
🧠 Pro Tip #
If you can’t point to evidence (MSA, calibration, SPC, PM logs, master checks) for a control, assume D will be weaker (higher) and O higher—and plan to fix it in Step 6.